Author Archives: manchak
Congratulations to Thomas Barrett (Princeton) for winning the 2013 Robert K. Clifton Memorial Prize in Philosophy of Physics!
The conference will take place July 29-31 in Munich.
We invite submissions of both a short abstract (max. 100 words) and an extended abstract (1000 words) through our automatic submission system by 1 February, 2013. To submit, please prepare your abstracts for blind review, and save your extended abstract as a PDF file. Then follow the link to our Conference System.
When logged in, go to the new submission page. Include your 100 words abstract and upload the PDF file of your extended abstract. You will be able to revise your submission any number of times before the deadline (1 February, 2013). Please feel free to contact the organizers with any questions you may have.
CFP: Irvine-Pittsburgh-Princeton Conference on the Mathematical and Conceptual Foundations of Physics
Over the past few decades, philosophers of physics and others have made important contributions to the mathematical and conceptual foundations of physical theories by critically analyzing how the mathematical structures of such theories inform central philosophical concerns, and in some cases by proving new theorems of high philosophical interest. This conference aims to bring together physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of physics working on such technical issues. The venue is April 4, 2013 at the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh. The event will immediately precede a workshop on “Relativistic Causality in Quantum Field Theory and General Relativity” taking place on April 5-7.
Papers by young researchers, especially graduate students, are particularly encouraged and may be given priority. Commentators and discussants will include Jeff Barrett, Bob Batterman, Jeremy Butterfield, John Earman, Hans Halvorson, John Norton, Giovanni Valente, and Jim Weatherall, among others. The length limit of the papers is 5000 words and submissions should be sent to:
Submission deadline is December 30, 2012. Decisions will be communicated by March 1, 2013.
The Fourth Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) will be organized and hosted by the Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki, Finland, 28-31 August 2013.
On April 7, at the Pacific APA in Seattle, we will celebrate twenty-five years since the publication of Arthur Fine’s book, The Shaky Game, with a symposium and reception in his honor. Speakers will include Paul Horwich, Laura Ruetsche, Thomas Ryckman, along with Arthur himself. More information can be found here.
First International Conference on Logic and Relativity, Budapest, September 8 – 12, 2012. István Németi is turning 70 in 2012. We are pleased to announce that the Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics is organizing the 1st International Logic and Relativity Conference in honor of this occasion. The main topics of the conference are logic, relativity theory, and their connections.
Topics include (but are not restricted to):
Logical foundations of spacetime theories
I will be presenting some recent work at the next Southern California Philosophy of Physics Group meeting (Jan 14, 3:00pm, UC Irvine, SST 777).
Abstract: The Hawking-Penrose-Geroch singularity theorems tell us that (almost) all physically reasonable cosmological models are geodesically incomplete (i.e. they have “singularities”). On the other hand, a number of geodesically incomplete models seem to be artificial in various senses (e.g. they contain “holes” or have “extensions”). Two independent conditions — hole-freeness and inextendibility — serve to rule out some (but by no means all) of these seemingly artificial models. Here, I examine the relationship between these two conditions and the existence of singularities. First, I review what is known: geodesic completeness implies inextendibility. Next, I show that geodesic completeness also implies hole-freeness. (This answers a question posed by Geroch.) In addition, I introduce a simple intermediate condition — effective completeness — which is entailed by geodesic completeness and also entails both hole-freeness and inextendibility. Why might such a condition be of interest? It seems to be strong enough to rule out, in one fell swoop, both types of seemingly artificial models at issue here (and possibly other types as well) but weak enough to allow the more physically reasonable, geodesically incomplete models guaranteed by the singularity theorems. Finally, I show that under certain causality assumptions, there is a useful hierarchy of singularity types: geodesic completeness entails effective completeness which entails inextendibility which entails hole-freeness.